Now, with a warrant, they can always go to the information service provider and attempt to get that information. But even then, they may not be able to because the party selling the encryption services may be a third party and may not even know who the parties are that are communicating.

Look, if I were running the FBI, you know, I probably would want to have backdoors as well, so I'm sympathetic to the director's view. But there is risk if you put that backdoor in. There's no question you enhance the risk, number one. Number two, there are the privacy implications that are of concern to parties.

I don't think it's a lack of will. I think it's an issue of what people view as constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment, number one, and what customers and business partners expect around the world from secure computing systems. And it's a difference of view.

You know, yes, you can always argue that a backdoor can be built that's more secure, you know, and more difficult to get to and only law enforcement's going to get there. But nobody in the field of security believes that's ultimately going to provide this same protection that a tight end-to-end solution has without a backdoor.

We're not all on the same page here. So most of us in the technology community are opposed to what we call backdoors that would allow law enforcement to tap in.

Sure, end-to-end encryption means that whether it's a phone call we're on or an email message we're sending or any form of electronic communication, that the content of that communication is encrypted from your device, such as your phone or PC, unto the other person's device at the other side, wherever they might be on the planet Earth.