We would be in a nasty position indeed if empirical science were the only kind of science possible.

Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous science -- the dream is over.

The ideal of a pure phenomenology will be perfected only by answering this question pure phenomenology is to be separated sharply from psychology at large and, specifically, from the descriptive psychology of the phenomena of consciousness.

Philosophers, as things now stand, are all too fond of offering criticism from on high instead of studying and understanding things from within.

Natural objects, for example, must be experienced before any theorizing about them can occur.

To every object there correspond an ideally closed system of truths that are true of it and, on the other hand, an ideal system of possible cognitive processes by virtue of which the object and the truths about it would be given to any cognitive subject.

In all the areas within which the spiritual life of humanity is at work, the historical epoch wherein fate has placed us is an epoch of stupendous happenings.

Psychologically experienced consciousness is therefore no longer pure consciousness construed Objectively in this way, consciousness itself becomes something transcendent, becomes an event in that spatial world which appears, by virtue of consciousness, to be transcendent.

What is thematically posited is only what is given, by pure reflection, with all its immanent essential moments absolutely as it is given to pure reflection.

Experience by itself is not science.

All perception is a gamble.

All consciousness is consciousness of something

The perception of duration itself presupposes a duration of perception.

Within this widest concept of object, and specifically within the concept of individual object, Objects and phenomena stand in contrast with each other.