But I think the global economy will understand that the United States has the ability to meet its obligations. But it's not going to be able to do it over the long term if we can't control the growth of government.

But the technology was accessible, which suggests incompetence on the part of our counterintelligence community and the Clinton Administration, and may in fact rise to the level of treason.

As a member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I will be participating in several hearings on the startling revelations contained in the report.

What are the implications of a China that may be on nuclear parity with the United States?

The Cox Report documents a systematic, well-planned effort by the Chinese military at the highest levels to target and acquire technology for military modernization.

In its report, the Cox Committee concludes that China is using stolen U.S. design information to speed up its deployment of a new nuclear missile force.

Like any good spy novel, the Cox Report alleges that Chinese spies penetrated four U.S. weapons research labs and stole important information on seven nuclear warhead designs.

Since 1998, the Administration has begun to upgrade counterintelligence and security at U.S. weapons labs.

The U.S. government knew that China wanted to acquire sensitive U.S. technology, and instead of implementing a policy to prevent them from acquiring the information, the government all but gave them an invitation to take our equipment and designs.

As the war on terrorism spreads and prolongs, the fruits of ending the threat of terrorism around the world will be tempered with a whole new series of problems to be addressed and resolved.

The committee discloses that even after the U.S. government learned of the diversion of U.S. designs for nuclear warheads in late 1995, the Clinton Administration failed to take steps immediately to improve security.

The United States government first learned of the diversion of the W-88 nuclear warhead design in late 1995.

There is a difference between strategic or technical default and default where you really don't have the economy to support the spending. We are not at that point yet. We could be. We could be, like some European nations.

I am in the process of trying to decide whether I can make a substantive and productive contribution to the policy-making process. I was always there because I wanted to work on the pressing issues of the day - I'm interested in energy, I'm interested in the climate bill and technology policy.